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In Women Who Make a Fuss (2014), Isabelle Stengers and Vinciane Despret
reflect on their field-based approach to philosophy and write that
[w]e worked this way because we imagined that philosophy should
be done this way…because this is what we hoped for it to be: it
was in doing philosophy this way that we showed that it was
possible…Most of all we did it because this freedom of
movement, for us, was the good fortune of philosophers.1
For philosophers interested in the possibilities of the field, their work acts as
an important guide to ways of experimenting with method, topic and
approach. Yet, while emphasising the freedom one might find within philoso-
phy, they also suggest reasons for caution. In particular Stengers and Despret
describe a range of overt and covert forms of disciplinary policing that they
have encountered in their efforts to work in the ways that they do. This is
attributed, in part, to ‘the philosophers’ routine of judging that most of their
colleagues are not “true” philosophers’.2 So while philosophers arguably have
the good fortune of practising a profession that in one light appears to
encourage dissident thinking and following unlikely paths, in another light
they also have the misfortune of working within a profoundly constrictive dis-
cipline that polices who can claim to be a member.3
While Stengers and Despret are reluctant to call out academic philosophy for
its discriminatory practices, it is clear that the routinized dismissal they iden-
tify is not experienced by all philosophers equally. Instead, as has been high-
lighted by a range of critics, philosophy is rife with assumptions that bolster
idealized versions of elite white masculinity, while discriminating against
many other groups and intersections thereof. This includes work that dis-
cusses racism and sexism within philosophy;4 the ways prejudices can inter-
sect, such as in the experiences of black women;5 as well as challenges to
core philosophical concepts for their bias in terms of ability, sex and race.6
For Kristie Dotson and Gayle Salamon, the fact that dismissals of other philos-
ophers are embedded within long histories of exclusion, leads them to
develop a more generalized account of what they term philosophy’s ‘culture
of justification’.7 They highlight the pervasive expectation within disciplinary
philosophy that no matter what kinds of moves one might make they must
still be actively justified in terms of dominant norms. In contrast to the
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freedom that Stengers and Despret highlight, they discuss a constrictive envir-
onment that has little time for people, approaches and methods that are
deemed incongruent with these norms. Indeed Salamon declared that, as a
result, her form of freedom of movement would consist of leaving the discip-
line for a more supportive environment elsewhere.8
Given the opportunity to reflect on my own experiences at the Paris work-
shop on Field philosophy and other experiments, what preoccupied me was how
the fledgling approach might find ways to wrangle with the force of this cul-
ture of justification. Efforts to develop creative engagements between field
and philosophy take place within a context that is profoundly restrictive, and
field philosophy has been announced as a form of freedom from this. Indeed
when making the case for their own approach to field philosophy, Robert
Frodeman, Adam Briggle and J. Britt Holbrook propose it as a mode of
‘philosophy unbound’,9 as ‘philosophy dedisciplined’,10 or as ‘reaching
escape velocity’ from capture by the neoliberal university.11 These modifiers
and metaphors, while inspiring, do not sit easily with me given the context I
have already outlined. As such, in this article I contribute a more conflicted
account to the literature by tracing my own movements on the path from
PhD candidate to field philosopher. As Frodeman and Briggle point out,
such experiences are rarely reflected on or written up, but are needed if
future philosophers are to benefit from them or for them to be built upon
and perhaps even institutionalized.12
The modifier I have chosen to frame my remarks moves from a philosophy
unbound, to a philosophy disturbed. My use of this term arises from two dif-
ferent sources. Both point to the isolation, discomfort or even trauma that is
often experienced by the one who disturbs, while also holding on to the new
possibilities that a disturbance may open up. As Salamon notes, for example,
the queer philosopher who also works on queer philosophy often experiences
a refusal, sometimes violently so, to see the combination of both queer and
philosophy as coherent. Rather than being able to find a location where such
an approach might find a home, she writes that ‘sometimes the relation of
queer work to philosophy is perceived in an additive way—I work on queer
theory and philosophy—but sometimes queerness is understood as an agent
of bifurcation—I work on queer theory and thus the philosophy that I do is
not quite philosophy’.13 To disturb the coherence of the discipline is thus to
be excluded from it. Even so, in comments that resonate with wider feminist
theorising about complex identifications, hybridity and boundary crossing,14
Salamon writes that while her mode of doing philosophy ‘sometimes disturbs
presumptions of proper identity or proper place, perhaps that disturbance
can be a means of forging hopeful new modes of knowledge and methods of
inquiry from the old’.15 Thus part of what I address in my account is how an
attempt to develop a field-based practice—which may also be seen as additive
or as a bifurcation—uncomfortably breaks assumptions of the proper identity
and place of the philosopher. But I also suggest that such an approach might
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more hopefully work back on philosophy in order to support more liveable
options for those experiencing painful incongruities within the discipline.
The second inspiration for the term disturbance arises from a particular type
of field philosophy, specifically philosophical ethology.16 In their paper ‘The
Phenomenology of Animal Life’, Dominique Lestel, Jeffrey Bussolini and
Matthew Chrulew discuss cases of an orangutan who ties knots and cats who
break child-proof locks on refrigerators to eat chilies. Behaviours like these
are usually excluded from ethological accounts of a species’ capacities, since
they have arisen due to living closely with humans. These behaviours have
thus been thought of as unnatural, abnormal or disturbed. Indeed these ani-
mals are thought to be ‘contaminated’ by their close association with
humans.17 When talking about behaviours developed by intensively farmed
animals to cope with stress,18 such negative connotations may make sense.
But for Lestel, Bussolini and Chrulew, attempting to develop an account of a
pure set of behaviours, specific to a species removed from wider relations,
denies the capacity for creativity demonstrated in multi-species interactions.
Studying knot-tying and chili-eating challenges the urge to isolate species in
order to understand them, and suggests instead that ethologists investigate
the ‘commingling of worlds and its productive transformations’.19 Under
their model, those living outside their ‘proper’ domain need not be read as
disturbed, but as expressing their capacities for invention and meaning-mak-
ing with others.
This second concept of disturbance offers an evocative, if unexpected, way of
reframing the relation of field philosophers to a broader discipline that, like
ethology, is caught up in fiercely policing its boundaries. Involving significant
engagements with people, places and problems found outside traditional
philosophy departments, researchers employing this approach inevitably stray
away from their discipline-mates. They develop insights within commingled
worlds, and take part in hybrid communities that complicate loyalties and
responsibilities. In doing so they rarely fit easily into the disciplinary mould,
if they ever did to begin with. Ideals of universal knowledge and truth are
put into question by contexts where the specific and the situated make par-
ticular claims on one’s work. Thus to begin to venture into the realm of field
philosophy is to confront the disturbance this creates in the notion of a
properly behaving philosopher. Yet, as with Salamon’s account, Lestel,
Bussolini and Chrulew, point to the possibilities within disturbance and
incongruence. Indeed they highlight skills, capacities and interests that may
never have arisen if it hadn’t been for the diversity of interactions
experienced.
These and other themes work their way through the reflections I offer in this
paper. Rather than focusing on one specific argument, I have traced some of
my own movements within and outwith philosophy, highlighting some of the
difficulties and opportunities of this approach. These movements adopt an
arc that includes leaving, transversing and circling back. Within these
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movements, I am particularly interested in the labours involved in adopting
new methods and when working in new sites of enquiry. Alongside the
uncertainties and anxieties that arise, I suggest that bringing your expertise
and even identification as ‘philosopher’ with you when you move sites is far
from automatic. Working without clear legitimating structures, or supporting
legacies that might guide your activities, means that reconstituting ourselves
outside of our traditional habitats is intense work. Still, I suggest that field
philosophers should lay claim to the boundary policing question ‘how is
this philosophy?’ when discussing their work, not as an attempt at justifica-
tion, but in order to proliferate accounts of what philosophy is and can be.
In doing so, I offer my own hope for what philosophy might be, namely
that it adopt a more open and unexpected relationship to the future,
turned more strongly towards supporting diversity rather than defend-
ing purity.
Leaving
To the eyes of those outside the discipline, I would appear to have a straight-
forward and legitimate relationship to academic philosophy in that I have
completed my PhD in the subject. This was a rather traditional doctorate at
the University of New South Wales in Australia, where I wrote a five chapter
thesis that incorporated a lot of exposition and analysis, both of feminist phil-
osophy and of Jacques Derrida’s work. In it I looked at the interrelations
between concepts of time and concepts of community. There were a few bor-
der skirmishes, including suggesting that philosophical approaches to time
failed to address what social scientists called ‘social time’, but my criticisms
were safely contained in the first chapter and so less disruptive than they
might have been. Even so, what those inside the discipline will know is that
my work on feminist deconstruction had already put me well on the margins.
Indeed one colleague told me that in choosing to focus on both feminism
and deconstruction, I had guaranteed that no philosophy department would
ever hire me.
Perhaps because time has no disciplinary holdfast,20 and the study of it is
often described as intrinsically interdisciplinary, I found that after my studies
I was able to move fields in quite unexpected ways. Leaving made the incon-
gruity that was such a problem in my home discipline into something more
positively received. My first academic position was at an interdisciplinary
research centre called the Centre for Research on Socio-Cultural Change
(CRESC) at the University of Manchester. Here I found myself surrounded
by fellow ‘misfits’ (as one centre director described us) who came mainly
from anthropology, sociology and history. In this new environment I started
thinking more about method, with a key strand of research at the centre
revolving around ‘the social life of methods’.21 Methods were something we
had never spoken about during my PhD, much to the horrified curiosity of
my new colleagues. I also came up against a certain disdain for the arrogance
of philosophers, and their abstract approach to problems. Being given room
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to think more about the approaches I used, as well as being challenged to
engage more with the empirical, opened up possibilities for me that had
been unavailable in my former surrounds.
My new environment allowed me to start looking at topics I would have never
dared to before. In particular, freedom from the boundary policing I had
been used to allowed me to start challenging the split between my interests
and what counted as a specifically philosophical interest. I was able to bring
more of myself into my work. Others seem to have found this too. Despret,
for example, in her own account of becoming a field philosopher, talks of no
longer having to amputate parts of herself to practice philosophy, and being
able to follow the experiences that deeply interested her.22 In my case, while
before my volunteer work with peace organisations and community-based
environmental groups had been a distracting side project, these interests
could now be brought more centrally into my research without having to
turn them into traditional political or environmental philosophy. Moving
away from a home where I often felt unwelcome became a movement towards
experimenting with ways I could bring more parts of myself into my work. I
began exploring a range of social science methods, and over the course of a
few years I was awarded funding to look at issues such as the role of time in
activist communities, more-than-human methods, extinctions and local food
(the first two I will discuss further below). Even so, I struggled with working
out how to operate confidently between philosophy and social science, and
worried that I was amateurishly dabbling in a whole lot of areas that I had
never been trained in.
The opportunities afforded by field philosophy, as an approach that enables
the integration of a wider range of one’s concerns and experiences, operate
alongside related difficulties as well. This is particularly so in regard to the
status of one’s work with others within the discipline. Discussing their similar
venture into strange topics that do not look philosophical, Stengers and
Despret write that ‘we know that for certain men (and women!) our topics
are suspect, or susceptible to dishonouring philosophy. Hypnosis, addicts,
witches, the Arabian babbler, peasants, the uneasy dead…problems that are
neither serious, nor conventional’.23 They argue that their hope for what
philosophy might be was part of what encouraged them to focus on such
topics. However despite their optimism they point out that, ‘we know that
our works are not referenced in our profession, in the sense that citing them
does not help those who cite them to be recognised as true philosophers’.24
Indeed as Dotson argues ‘the profession of philosophy requires the practice
of making congruent one’s own ideas, projects and…pedagogical choices
with some “traditional” conception of philosophical engagement’.25 Positive
status is dependent upon proving this congruence via the accepted processes
of legitimation.26
Within the culture Dotson describes then, the field philosopher might easily
come to look a little like the chili-eating cat, a disturbed creature who
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encourages suspicion. Unable to legitimize themselves through standard proc-
esses, they also risk being unable to receive or offer recognized status within
the discipline. This is particularly the case for those who are already marginal-
ized by not fitting the dominant model of elite white masculinity within phil-
osophy. One of the key questions for those interested in supporting the
growth of field philosophy is how to respond to this culture of justification
and in particular who might be expected to carry the burden of destabilising
norms. For example what might be done to provide career paths for junior
scholars and PhD students interested in this approach, but who are rightly
wary of the risks involved?27 In the early stages of my own career, being
unable to make my interests congruent with accepted patterns, meant that
the question of ‘how is this philosophy?’ was very raw. So much so that it
seemed easier to give up claiming that I was still somehow a philosopher and
instead present myself as an interdisciplinary scholar. What this suggests is
that negotiating one’s relationship with one’s home discipline is part of the
key work of a field philosopher, but as I want to discuss next, leaving does
not lay this task to rest.
Transversing
By and large, philosophy presents itself as a discipline interested in the pursuit
of universal knowledge and principles. Neither the body one inhabits nor the
location one finds oneself in should have any bearing on the work a philoso-
pher produces. Transcending the particular, the merely ontic, the situated, is
very much the name of the game. Mainstream philosophy thus has little to say
about the problem of how a philosopher might transverse a new site or field,
and how such movements might fundamentally transform how one approaches
the task of philosophy. Critical philosophers and scholars from a range of
social science disciplines have, however, paid particular attention to this prob-
lem, and formulating an approach to it represents another part of the key
work to be undertaken by a field philosopher. I’ve already suggested that in
moving from a school of philosophy to an interdisciplinary research centre, I
also made changes in methods, topics and even academic identification. But it
was when conducting fieldwork for the various projects and then writing this
up that the harder edges of resistance to this movement across fields became
felt. While Thierry Bardini, reflecting on Dominique Lestel's work, proposes
that ‘as soon as a philosopher neglects for a while his or her beloved exegesis,
he or she de facto transforms into a field philosopher’,28 my experience sug-
gests that while we may change sites, bringing the ‘philosopher’ with us and
trying to reconstitute it outside its traditional domain is far from a
fait accompli.
For one, even the simple fact that a field philosopher finds themselves as a
humanities scholar pursuing their work ‘outside’ creates all kinds of incon-
gruence.29 In one project that looked at participatory research with non-
humans,30 a group of us found ourselves in North Devon engaging in a range
of activities with/in the River Torridge. This included testing for the mixing
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of salt and sweet water at the river mouth, searching through culm grasslands
for the river’s source, wild swimming, and playing poohsticks.31 We had a lot
of fun, and we also learned things, discussed ideas, argued about concepts,
and refined approaches to problems. All of these activities are parts of our
normal research work, but still our location opened us up to concerns that
we could potentially be read as academics using taxpayers’ money to fund a
jolly.32 In particular we noted that certain activities opened us up to this
more than others. Salinity testing, as fellow participant Niamh Moore
observed, looked like a legitimate and appropriate activity in the field
because it appeared scientific. But the poetry recital offered by artist Timothy
Collins while we were wild-swimming did not so easily read as ‘proper’
research. As the geographers J.D. Dewsbury and Simon Naylor note, ‘much
work in the social history of science has paid attention to the theme of bodies
in the field—in particular, who is allowed to conduct fieldwork, who isn’t,
how one acts in the field to produce information that is trustworthy and rep-
licable, how one deals with other bodies that shouldn’t be in the fieldsite,
and so on’.33 Humanities scholars, including philosophers, arguably form
part of the set that is to be excluded, or are simply assumed not to be inter-
ested. There is thus a lack of readily-available legitimating structures or frame-
works for this kind of work.
Secondly, this lack of structures or frameworks for moving between such sites
raises questions about how one’s expertise is to be mobilized. Indeed, finding
yourself in a new place can feel as though you have strayed outside the boun-
daries where your expertise makes sense. A colleague, Kate Pahl, who is a lit-
eracies scholar, led another project funded by the same scheme that looked
at fishing in youth work and connected the work of philosopher Ernst Bloch
with coarse fishing in Rotherham. In her fieldnotes, which she generously
shared with me after discussing this issue, Pahl describes feeling uneasy and
useless. She writes that during the field visits she felt that was not contribu-
ting very much. Unable to catch a fish, and unable to adopt her usual
research methods of analysing the situation with others—the talking dis-
turbed the fish—she writes that ‘I did not do anything useful, in fact…This
perhaps was my role within the project – to erase myself, in order for the
“real work” to happen’.34 Pahl’s reflections raise important questions for field
philosophers about the place (and emplacement) of expertise. Her account
suggests that it is not enough to have been an expert in one site for this
expertise to be carried to another. Encountering other places and people,
and being immersed in their forms of knowledge and expertise, means that
the field philosopher not only needs to negotiate with their home discipline,
but also has to reshape their expertise in the new contexts they find them-
selves in.
Pahl’s account resonates with me because I had also felt a reticence about
contributing my expertise, as the work of translating philosophy between
such different sites was not something I had properly considered. I perhaps
felt similar to Despret who, when writing about her research in Israel, which
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focused on biologist Amotz Zahavi and his work on babblers, notes that
‘[m]y objective was simple: to do in the field what philosophers did with
respect to texts. I did not intend this to be a significant change in my
research, except inasmuch as it would lend an anthropological dimension
to the study, which I hoped would be original. And I would certainly take
more pleasure in observing scientists in beautiful desert landscapes than in
reading about them in libraries’.35 I too enjoyed the opportunity to meet
fascinating people and visit many beautiful sites across the UK and Australia
in my projects, and yet I too did not think through how my expertise,
including in particular methods and forms of research, might need to be
reconsidered.
Frodeman, Briggle and Holbrook have discussed the philosopher’s work in
terms of a certain ‘subterranean quality’, and suggest that the field philoso-
pher’s interventions may remain ‘half-hidden and interstitial in nature’.36 For
them our work in the field continues to be ‘revealing concealed premises,
drawing out implicit contradictions, and connecting disparate insights’.37
How one actually goes about this is nonetheless an open question. Learning
when to intercede and when to keep quiet, when to listen and when to chal-
lenge will be different within the specific community gathered by each
research project. Philosophers’ training in debating and argument styles
more generally, which can be combative and off-putting,38 may encourage
unhelpful responses, including the aspiring field philosopher overcompensat-
ing for their disorientation and taking over the collective thinking process.
Incorporating literatures from participatory research, which deals extensively
with the problem of negotiating expertise with others, could thus be an
important step in developing the approach.
What the above suggests is that, while the idea of leaving the discipline of
philosophy was enticing, I had actually been moving in a more transverse
fashion, operating across my old competencies while working to develop new
ones. This became particularly clear when I moved to writing up. Here I was
confronted most strongly with the disciplinarity that remained. The flexible
academic identity that I had so eagerly constructed throughout the develop-
ment and running of my projects ran up against the inflexibility of norms
around writing style, evidentiary proof and what counts as a significant contri-
bution. I had previously felt troubled about adapting methods from sociology
and anthropology, such as qualitative interviews, focus groups and short-term
ethnography. There had been some territoriality, particularly from anthropol-
ogists who held the notion of ethnography particularly dear, but in general I
had been encouraged to look for ways of making these methods my own.
When I came to writing up, however, I found I couldn’t, and in fact didn’t
want to, write like a social scientist. I wasn’t sure if I could prove I had a rep-
resentative sample, or that I had immersed myself sufficiently with my so-
called ‘informants’. Despite it all, the veneer of the interdisciplinary scholar
fell away and I wanted what I did to be philosophy somehow, although admit-
tedly a significantly reworked version of it.
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To share some of my worries at the time, I quote from a paper I gave in 2015
at the University of Wollongong, where I explained these dilemmas to an
audience of geographers:
So I might as well be honest and say that I’m presenting myself
here before you today in a bit of a muddle, particularly about how
I’m going to work with the materials I’ve gathered for this
project…Part of this muddle is because I’m a philosopher who
can’t answer the questions she’s interested in through close
readings of philosophical texts. As a result I’ve become a bit ill-
disciplined. That is, I’ve been out visiting people, having
conversations with them and taking note of interesting things that
happen while I’m there. Portions of these conversations have
been recorded and transcribed, and some of these transcriptions
have even been inputted into NVivo. At this stage, if you are a
social scientist there will be a whole range of options for what you
might want to do next. You’ll have learnt many of these in your
undergrad and PhD. You’ll be able to turn to the refresher videos
on YouTube if you’ve forgotten some of the particulars, but most
importantly you’ll probably feel a connection with your fore-
mothers and fathers who have developed these methods, critiqued
them, refined them and passed some of these complex histories
on to you. Sitting in front of my computer, playing with the
functions on NVivo, I was instead wondering how I could work
with what the project’s participants had contributed without
attracting accusations of producing the dreaded ‘bad social
science’ that often (and quite rightly) is levelled at those like
myself who make forays outside of their assigned disciplines.
In particular I was hoping for feedback on how a philosopher might draw on
conversations and experiences in the field (more often known as interviews
and participant observation) in their work. What kinds of claims would it be
reasonable for them to make? What does a philosopher do with interview
transcripts, conversations that are developed in the moment, when so many
of our methods are focused on analysing arguments that have been worked
out in detail, and revised/rephrased to respond to counter arguments?
These, and other related questions, are ones I have yet to find a satisfactory
answer to.
Circling back
What kind of movement produces the field philosopher then? Neglecting
exegesis for a time, as Bardini suggests, might be an initial step, but it is not
quite enough, nor is simply changing topics and location. Indeed, adopting
too simple an idea of the philosopher’s freedom of movement risks reassert-
ing the universality of philosophical knowledge that many field philosophers
would want to critique. That is, it risks reasserting the knower free of location
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and context and thus able to move without friction. Moving, in and of itself,
is not enough because as geographer Jennifer Hyndman points out, ‘the
experience of being there does not in itself produce knowledge and expertise
about a place and people’.39 Instead as Dewsbury and Naylor argue, drawing
on Bruno Latour, ‘knowledge production is sited. It is made in particular
spaces through the labours of myriad human and non-human entities, and
only moves beyond those spaces through yet more labour’.40 Similarly our
particular modes of philosophy do not transfer neatly from one site to
another. Instead we need to explore what this ‘yet more labour’ entails and
experiment with how philosophy might be practised in/from the field. As
others have insisted, this means that philosophy’s methods, core questions
and forms of evaluation need to reimagined and reworked.
Despret writes that her own process involved ‘a long journey elsewhere
before I could agree to return home’, and to me this notion of circling
back represents another key step in the movement towards a field philoso-
phy.41 Circling back signals a return of sorts, but a return that seeks to re-
examine and reconsider. For myself, it was after the kinds of conversations I
had in Wollongong and elsewhere that I belatedly went searching for a
framework that might provide an opening for returning to philosophy on
more amenable terms. It was only then that I came upon the idea of ‘field
philosophy’, not as many others in this special issue did via philosophical
ethology, but through the work of Frodeman and Briggle. Their bringing
together of environmental philosophy, continental philosophy and participa-
tory methods spoke closely to my concerns, as did their claim that philoso-
phers should ‘vary their material culture’.42 Even more welcome, they wrote
that ‘philosophy needs to get outside more often. The sunshine will do it
good’.43 With this kind of backing I finally felt more confident in asserting
the productive potential of my incongruence and in rejecting the narrowness
of the culture of justification discussed by Dotson and Salamon. I found an
opening onto new frameworks within which to validate my work to myself
and others, ones that did not require attempts to produce congruence with
traditional conceptions.
For Dotson, challenging the reliance on narrow disciplinary norms means
moving philosophy towards a ‘culture of praxis’ where instead of a dominant
set of legitimating norms there are ‘a proliferation of disciplinary validations’,
helping to create environments where ‘senses of incongruence become sites
of exploration’.44 Part of the ‘yet more labour’ for field philosophers, thus
includes developing their own take on what counts as valid work and for
whom, but within a wider framework that values diversity rather than purity.
One possibility is to return to the question of ‘How is this philosophy?’ – not
as a mechanism of purification as Dotson rightly critiques, but in the spirit of
Stengers and Despret, of showing what is possible; in the spirit too of the
philosophical ethologist engaging with the knot-tying chimpanzee or the
chili-eating cats. By demonstrating creative, opportunistic and malleable
behaviours, these singular animals expand the sense of what is possible. They
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do this, not on their own, or isolated with others of their kind, but by living
in multi-species communities. Such communities are not utopic by any
means, and the role of domination and exploitation needs to remain a key
consideration. Yet far from rejecting those whose lives have been modified by
their interactions with others, Lestel et al. argue for an ethology that exam-
ines ‘how animals, including humans, surmount, interpret, and move around
their various limits in practices of freedom’.45 From this perspective, asking a
field philosopher to discuss the role of philosophy in their work could oper-
ate, not as a demand for justification, but as an invitation to share the ways
that philosophy’s various limits have been surmounted, interpreted and
moved around in their collaborative work with others. To show how this
might work I will offer two examples from my own projects.
The first example is a project I mentioned briefly above which looked at the
potential for participatory research with non-humans.46 Called ‘In
Conversation With… : Co-designing with more-than-human communities,’
this project was inspired by one of the primary claims of participatory
research, namely that those affected by research should be included in it.
Our question was, if this is the case why should the definition of participants
be bounded by the human? Nonhumans are also affected by research so
would there be any benefits to them of being included as well? If so how
might their participation be conceived and practiced? Our approach
involved running experimental workshops that explored what might happen
if various non-humans were invited into common methodological frame-
works such as participatory design and participatory action research.
Crucially we did not set out to prove whether or not more-than-human par-
ticipatory research was possible. Instead we implicitly followed techniques
found within philosophy, including conceptual analysis, thought experi-
ments, and argument techniques like reductio ad absurdum, which enable
researchers to begin with a ‘what if’ and explore the consequences that fol-
low, no matter how strange or unlikely the starting premise appears to be.
We thus participated in a range of activities with dogs, bees, trees and water,
in a speculative and experimental way, and saw where the participatory meth-
ods opened up in interesting directions and where they seemed to fail
entirely. Thought experiments within philosophy, such as the brain-in-the vat
problem and the trolley problem, can be perceived quite negatively and have
been used to criticize philosophy for a lack of empirical grounding and a use-
less fascination with impossible problems. In this case, however, borrowing the
legitimacy given to speculation as a research method and translating it into a
decidedly non-traditional field site, enabled a novel field philosophy project
that was unlikely to find a supportive framework within more traditional social
science approaches.47
My second example is another small project that looked at the question of
time and sustainable economies. The idea here was that various economic
forms are often thought to be associated with a particular dominant tempor-
ality, for example pre-capitalism with task-based time, early capitalism with
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clock time, and late capitalism with accelerated time. Our question was what
kind of temporal narratives might emerge from attempts to develop more sus-
tainable forms of economic exchange. To study this I visited grassroots organ-
izations, engaged in participatory observation, and conducted interviews and
focus groups where members of the organizations and I discussed how time
arose in their work. While such grassroots movements have inspired little, if
any, philosophical work, within economic geography, there has been increas-
ing interest in ‘green niches’, as small organisations like these have been
termed. They are thought to provide incubation spaces for innovative sustain-
able technologies and approaches to develop outside of larger market pres-
sures. While the tone of some of this work is quite technophilic, Gill Seyfang
and Alex Haxeltine have argued that grassroots organizations might also be
places where ‘new social infrastructure and institutions, value sets, and prior-
ities are practised in a value space which is distinct from mainstream soci-
ety’.48 Given that values, ethics, and visions of what constitutes the good life
have been absolutely central to the discipline, my wonder was whether a fur-
ther set of innovations that may be incubated in these niches may be philo-
sophical in nature.
Green niches are thus potentially a rich site for the field philosopher. For
example, Thom van Dooren’s account of field philosophy describes it as
‘an effort to interrogate the structures of meaning, valuing, and knowing
that shape our worlds’.49 His particular approach moves from an ‘applied
ethics’ that is still often too formalized to an ‘emergent ethics’ that builds
knowledge through situated encounters that eschew universal claims.50
Crucially, green niches, and similar organisations/movements, might
enable the examination of structures of meaning, valuing and knowing, and
not only as they are conceived now, but as they are caught up in processes of
experimentation and transformation in response to a range of social and envir-
onmental concerns. Additionally, while van Dooren’s account emphasises the
possibilities of moving around the limits placed on subfields within philosophy
such as epistemology and ethics, my approach in this project suggests that
metaphysics too is ripe for rethinking from the field. While there is little work
available on an analogous ‘applied metaphysics’,51 the discussions my interlocu-
tors and I had about their localized experiments with time arguably suggest
openings towards an ‘emergent metaphysics’ that I hope to articulate more
fully in future work.
Disturbing futures
Midway through my work on this paper I had an online encounter that dem-
onstrates a response that I believe field philosophers will come up against
repeatedly when they try to discuss their work with disciplinary colleagues.53
Following an interview with Anita L. Allan in the New York Times about her
experiences as a black woman in philosophy,54 Justin Weinberg posted a
query on the Daily Nous asking for wider comments on Allan’s claim that
inclusiveness in philosophy could be supported by responding to emerging
Bastian
460
trends in research, such as philosophy of race, black feminist/womanist
thought, and incorporating these new fields of specialization into the curricu-
lum. Specifically he asked whether philosophy courses, in an effort to retain
black women students, should address more diverse topics and what these
topics might be. I suggested that the issue wasn’t necessarily identifying spe-
cific topics, but challenging the culture of strictly policing what counts as
‘proper’ philosophy and developing more openness towards non-traditional
approaches. Another commentator responded to me as follows:
It comes as no surprise to me that those who care least about the
threat of philosophy’s disintegration in higher education
(particularly in non-elite institutions) tend to be exactly those who
are already doing interdisciplinary work, are the most likely to
find a comfortable home in a non-philosophical department, and
have the least personal and professional commitment to the
preservation of the discipline. (Daily Nous, June 19, 2018, http://
dailynous.com/2018/06/19/denigration-black-women-
philosophers-fields-people-color/#comment-144965)
My point that boundary policing is damaging to philosophy, was met by the
very boundary policing in question, including a denial that I might have any
place in the future of the discipline. My incongruence signalled my disturbed
nature, contaminated by interdisciplinary work and housed inappropriately
away from my proper kin.
This foreclosure of philosophy’s future in response to the claims of those
who do not easily fit is something I have written about previously. In discus-
sing the exclusion of women from the profession I argued that ‘philosophy
continues to be guided by a narrow vision of the future that only admits of a
particular kind of philosopher. Rather than relating to the future as a force
that may profoundly transform it in ways that cannot be anticipated in the
present, the discipline stubbornly resists calls to change’.55 Even so, attempts
to colonize the future in this way do not contain all who have been or will be
inspired by its possibilities. Instead incongruent philosophers are finding ways
of moving out, athwart, and back; finding that the freedom of movement that
is promised to philosophers is, as James Baldwin notes, taken not given. For
me, field philosophy offers one way of moving towards such freedom. By
working with a wider range of co-researchers (both human and more-than-
human) to produce emergent knowledges it challenges the naive universalism
that has excluded so many forms of experiences, lives, hopes and concerns
from consideration. Moreover, I see field philosophy as one example of
Dotson’s proposal of a culture of praxis, offering one site for the prolifer-
ation of philosophical forms of validation and for a revaluing of incongru-
ence. In pursuing this approach it provides a more liveable space for me
within philosophy, even while also continuing to disturb, behaving improp-
erly, associating with ‘outsiders’, and committing, not to a static preservation,
but to a transformation of philosophy’s limits.
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Notes
1 Stengers and Despret, Women Who Make a
Fuss, 15.
2 Ibid., 45; see also Despret, “Not Read
Derrida.”
3 Note that throughout this paper I am
discussing academic philosophers in
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community philosophy and other movements
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Neoliberalism.”; Frodeman and Briggle,
Socrates Tenured; See also Frodeman and
Briggle, “Strawmen at the Symposium.”
12 Frodeman and Briggle, Socrates Tenured, 4.
13 Salamon, “Justification and Queer
Method,” 230.
14 e.g Anzald!ua, Borderlands/La Frontera.;
Lugones, Pilgrimages/Peregrinajes.; Lorde,
Sister Outsider.
15 Salamon, “Justification and Queer
Method,” 230.
16 Chrulew, “Philosophical ethology of Lestel”;
Buchanan et al., “General introduction.”
17 Lestel et al., “Phenomenology of Animal
Life,” 126
18 Wiepkema, “Abnormal Behaviours.”
19 Lestel et al., “Phenomenology of Animal
Life,” 144
20 History is often put forward as one place
that a time scholar might find a particular
home, however as critiques within the
discipline note, time is by and large taken
for granted and treated as a background
phenomenon by historians. For some of the
debates around this issue see for example
Ermarth, “Time is finite” and Jordheim,
“Against Periodization.”
21 e.g. Ruppert et al., “Special issue.”
22 Despret, “Not Read Derrida,” 97.
23 Stengers and Despret, Women Who Make a
Fuss, 15.
24 Ibid., 14-15.
25 Dotson, “How is this,” 6.
26 Ibid., 7.
27 Some of these problems are being
addressed by the Public Philosophy Network
(https://publicphilosophynetwork.ning.
com/). See also the statement by the
American Philosophical Association on
Public Philosophy (https://blog.apaonline.
org/2017/05/18/apa-statement-on-valuing-
public-philosophy/).
28 Bardini, “Preface,” 6.
29 See for example the beautiful Wild
Researchers project which seeks to ‘transport
us outside the lab and into the landscapes
where our researchers work’ (http://www.
wildresearchers.unsw.edu.au/). It features
only one humanities scholar, fellow field
philosopher Thom van Dooren.
30 Funded under the UK Arts and
Humanities Research Council’s Connected
Communities scheme which brought many
humanities scholars into unusual field sites
31 See http://www.morethanhumanresearch.
com/conversations-with-the-elements.html for
details on the workshop and http://www.
morethanhumanresearch.com/home/
category/water for participant reflections.
Note for those unfamiliar with Poohsticks, it is
a game from the children’s book Winnie-the-
Pooh where sticks are dropped from the
upstream side of a bridge and the winner is
the one whose stick comes out first on the
other side.
32 For those not familiar with this term, a
jolly is a project made to look like work, but
actually undertaken only for enjoyment at
someone else’s expense.
33 Dewsbury and Naylor, “Practising
Geographical Knowledge,” 257.
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34 Pahl, pers.comm. Fishing Fieldnotes
2018; Pahl, fieldnotes 4. 6. 2013.
35 Despret, “Not Read Derrida,” 98.
36 Frodeman et al., “Philosophy
Neoliberalism,” 324.
37 Ibid., 324.
38 e.g. Beebee, “Women and Deviance”;
McGill, “Silencing of Women.”
39 Hyndman, “Field as Here and Now,” 266.
40 Dewsbury and Naylor, “Practising
Geographical Knowledge,” 255.
41 Despret, “Not Read Derrida,” 93.
42 Frodeman and Briggle, Socrates Tenured,
116.
43 Ibid., 24.
44 Dotson, “How is this,” 26.
45 Lestel et al., “Phenomenology of Animal
Life,” 134.
46 Bastian et al.. Participatory Research; See also
http://www.morethanhumanresearch.com
47 Although for another example see
anthropologist Anne Galloway’s work, where
she has incorporated speculative approaches
from design and science fiction; E.g.
Galloway, “Towards Fantastic Ethnography.”
48 Seyfang and Haxeltine, “Growing
grassroots innovations,” 389.
49 van Dooren, “Thinking with Crows.”
50 Ibid.
51 Although see Hawley, “Applied Metaphysics.”
52 See also Frodeman and Briggle,
“Strawmen at the Symposium.”
53 Yancy, “Pain and Promise.”
54 Bastian, “Finding Time,” 225.
Bibliography
Anzald!ua, G. Borderlands/La Frontera: the new mestiza. 2nd ed. San Francisco: Aunt Lute
Books, 1999.
Babbitt, S.E. and S. Campbell, eds., Racism and Philosophy. Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, 1999.
Bardini, T., “Preface: A Field Philosopher with a Certain Taste for Fish, and Who
Does Not Mistake His Hat for an Ethology.” Angelaki 19, 3 (2014): 5–9 doi:
10.1080/0969725X.2014.975983.
Bastian, M., “Finding Time for Philosophy.” In Women in Philosophy: What needs to
change? Edited by Hutchison, K. and F. Jenkins, 215–230. New York: Oxford
University Press, 2013.
Bastian, M., O. Jones, N. Moore, and E. Roe, eds., Participatory Research in More-than-
human Worlds London: Routledge, 2016.
Beebee, H., “Women and Deviance in Philosophy.” In Women in Philosophy: What needs
to change?, Edited by Katrina Hutchison and Fiona Jenkins, 61–80. Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2013.
Buchanan, B., J. Bussolini, and M. Chrulew, “General introduction: Philosophical
Ethology.” Angelaki 19, 3 (2014): 1–3, doi: 10.1080/0969725X.2014.975977.
Chrulew, M., “The philosophical ethology of Dominique Lestel.” Angelaki 19, 3 (2014):
17–44, doi: 10.1080/0969725X.2014.976024.
Despret, V., “Why ‘I Had Not Read Derrida’: Often Too Close, Always Too Far Away.”
In French Thinking about Animals Edited by Stephanie Posthumus and Louisa
Mackenzie. Michigan State University Press, 2015.
Dewsbury, J.D. and S. Naylor, “Practising Geographical Knowledge: Fields, Bodies and
Dissemination.” Area 34, 3 (2002): 253–260. doi: 10.1111/1475-4762.00079.
Dotson, K., “How is this Paper Philosophy?” Comparative Philosophy 3, 1 (2012): 3–29.
doi: 10.31979/2151-6014(2012).030105.
Ermarth, E.D., “Time is finite: The implications for history.” Rethinking History 5, 2
(2001): 195–215.
Frodeman, R., “Philosophy dedisciplined.” Synthese 190 (2013): 1917–1936. doi:
10.1007/s11229-012-0181-0.
Frodeman, R., “Philosophy Unbound: Environmental Thinking at the End of the Earth.”
Environmental Ethics 30 (2008): 313–324. doi: 10.5840/enviroethics200830335.
parallax
463
Frodeman, R. and A. Briggle. Socrates Tenured: The institutions of 21st century philosophy.
New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 2016.
Frodeman, R. and A. Briggle, “Strawmen at the Symposium: A Response.” Philosophy of
the Social Sciences 48 (2017): 80–94. doi: 10.1177/0048393117740844.
Frodeman, R., A. Briggle, and J.B. Holbrook, “Philosophy in the Age of
Neoliberalism.” Social Epistemology, 26 (2012): 311–330. doi: 10.1080/
02691728.2012.722701.
Galloway, A., “Towards Fantastic Ethnography and Speculative Design.” Ethnography
Matters (2013).
Hawley, K., “Applied Metaphysics.” A Companion to Applied Philosophy. Edited by
Lippert-Rasmussen, K., K. Brownlee and D. Coady, 165–179. Malden: Wiley, 2017.
Hutchison, K. and F. Jenkins, eds., Women in Philosophy: What needs to change? Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2013)
Hyndman, J., “The Field as Here and Now, not There and Then.” Geographical Review
91 (2001): 262–272. doi: 10.1111/j.1931-0846.2001.tb00480.x.
Jordheim, H., “Against Periodization: Koselleck’s theory of multiple temporalities.”
History and Theory 51 (2012): 151–171.
Lestel, D., J. Bussolini, and M. Chrulew, “The Phenomenology of Animal Life.”
Environmental Humanities 5 (2014): 125–148. doi: 10.1215/22011919-3615442.
Lloyd, G. The Man of Reason: 'Male' and 'Female' in Western Philosophy. 2nd ed.
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993.
Lorde, A. Sister Outsider: Essays & Speeches. Freedom. California: The Crossing Press,
1984.
Lugones, M. Pilgrimages/Peregrinajes: Theorizing coalition against multiple oppressions.
Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003.
McGill, J., “The Silencing of Women.” In Women in Philosophy: What needs to change?
Edited by Hutchison, K. and F. Jenkins. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013.
Mills, C.W. The Racial Contract. London: Cornell University Press, 1997.
Pfeiffer, D., “The Philosophical Foundations of Disability Studies.” Disability Studies
Quarterly 22, 2 (2002): 3–23.
Ruppert, E., J. Law, and M. Savage, “Special issue on The Social Life of Methods.”
Theory, Culture and Society 30, 4 (2013).
Salamon, G., “Justification and Queer Method, or Leaving Philosophy.” Hypatia 24, 1
(2009): 225–230.
Seyfang, G. and A. Haxeltine, “Growing grassroots innovations: exploring the role of
community-based initiatives in governing sustainable energy transitions.”
Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy (Pion Ltd, 2012) doi: 10.1068/
c10222.
Stengers, I. and V. Despret. Women Who Make a Fuss: The Unfaithful Daughters of Virginia
Woolf. Translated by April Kutson. Minneapolis: Univocal, 2014.
Tiffany, Graeme. et al. Community Philosophy, Sapere: Philosophy for Children, Colleges,
Communities. Oxford, 2013: https://www.sapere.org.uk/default.aspx?tabid¼102 .
van Dooren, T., “Thinking with Crows: (Re)doing Philosophy in the Field.” Parallax
24, 4 (2018).
Wiepkema, P.R., “Abnormal Behaviours in Farm Animals: Ethological Implications.”
Netherlands Journal of Zoology 35 (1985): 279–299.
Yancy, G., “The Pain and Promise of Black Women in Philosophy.” New York Times,
June 18, 2018.
Yancy, G., “Situated Black Women's Voices in/on the Profession of Philosophy.”
Hypatia 23 (2008): 374–382.
Bastian
464
Michelle Bastian is a Chancellor’s Fellow at the Edinburgh College of Art,
University of Edinburgh. Her work crosses critical time studies and environ-
mental humanities, with a focus on the role of time in modes of exclusion
and inclusion. She is the co-editor of Participatory Research in More-than-Human
Worlds (Routledge) and has recent publications in Design Studies; new forma-
tions: a journal of culture, theory and politics, and the Journal of Environmental
Philosophy. Email: michelle.bastian@ed.ac.uk.
parallax
465
